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Introduction 
 
The current crisis has given new impetus to research on globalisation, the gold 
standard, financial crises and contagion in the 1930s.  In this article we re-examine the 
question of financial crisis in Britain in 1931, considering how the financial system 
might have been at risk.  We focus on the banking system, and argue that the major 
British commercial banks were sound, in contrast to certain merchant banks.  For a 
financial crisis to develop the links between these sectors would need to have been 
sufficiently strong to threaten the commercial banking system in a way that would 
have endangered the payments system.  But even if this had arisen, the Bank of 
England (‘the Bank’) was a mature lender of last resort (LLR), a role it had more or 
less perfected in the course of the nineteenth century. 
 
We first consider the nature of globalisation and financial crises, and whether 
there was a ‘financial crisis’ in Britain in 1931.  The next section briefly reviews 
Britain’s interwar economic performance, outlines the Bank’s role as LLR and the 
operation and some criticisms of British commercial banks, and considers the possible 
spread of ‘contagion’ to Britain from central Europe.  We then review a range of 
evidence on the main commercial banks in the 1930s, including new material from 
archival sources.  In the final section we discuss and contrast the nature of banking 
problems in other major countries to those in Britain and draw conclusions. 
 
 
Globalisation, crisis and British banking 
 
Globalisation, the increasing integration of markets and economies around the world, 
sees greater flows of goods, services, capital, and even labour.  The economic theory 
that predicts convergence in trade and factor prices also predicts resistance to the 
increased openness since the process will produce winners and losers.  The outcome 
depends upon the relative strengths of these groupings and on the prevailing 
institutional environment.  Not surprisingly there are crisis points. 
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The current era is sometimes described as one of unprecedented globalisation.  
An earlier era of globalisation, with its origins in the eighteenth century and its real 
beginnings in the nineteenth century, is variously argued to have ended with World 
War One or with the dislocations of the late 1920s and 1930s.  The justifiably highly 
acclaimed analysis of the distinguished historian Harold James argued that the 
globalisation which began to accelerate around 1870 ended in the years between the 
two world wars (James, 2001).  Many maintain that the end had come with the 
outbreak of war in 1914, but support for James can be found in, for example, Rajan 
and Zingales (2003), whose measures of financial development appear to have started 
falling in the 1930s or 1940s, not recovering to similar levels until 1990. 
 
The First World War was hugely disruptive for trade and capital flows, trade 
policy, migration, international monetary arrangements and much else.  The postwar 
Treaty of Versailles, which imposed punitive reparation payments on Germany, and 
squabbling among the allies over the repayment of debts accumulated in the war were 
damaging to international relations.  James argued that globalisation continued until 
the financial systems of the world crumbled in the Great Depression years between 
1929 and 1932.  He then suggested that at the end of the twentieth century weak 
financial systems appeared similar to those of the 1930s and therefore signalled likely 
doom. 
 
It is vitally important to learn the correct lessons from the past as the current 
experience of globalisation experiences understandable strains.  The essence of the 
James thesis is that globalisation was brought to a halt as governments struggled to 
influence their domestic economies in the 1920s and 1930s because ‘... financial and 
banking systems were volatile and vulnerable to panic’ (James, 2001, p. 31).  We 
agree with James on the weaknesses in central European finance, but suggest a caveat 
to an important part of the thesis on ‘... the vulnerability of the British financial 
system’ (James, 2001, p. 69). 
 
Defining ‘financial crisis’ 
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Taxonomies of ‘crises’ abound (Kindleberger & Aliber, 2005, p. 34).  We consider 
that Schwartz (1986) provides the most satisfactory definition of a ‘real financial 
crisis’ as circumstances when the money stock is under threat i.e. only when there is a 
threat to the payments system.  A collapse in the money stock in the face of sticky 
wages and prices leads to a collapse in real output, for which reason growth in the 
money stock should be preserved.  The failure of a large financial institution, or 
perhaps a major company or municipality, represents a ‘pseudo-crisis’, which may 
create problems for shareholders and taxpayers but not threaten the financial system. 
 
The money supply is determined by the actions of the monetary authorities, the 
banks, and the non-bank public.  The latter two hold currency and deposits in certain 
proportions.  When the public fear banking difficulties they move out of bank deposits 
into currency, and the banks raise their cash reserves to accommodate that demand.  
Banks in fractional reserve systems take deposits, and make loans, and thereby 
multiply the stock of money.  When banks fail, or take steps to reduce their assets, 
they reduce the money stock, abrupt falls in which will damage the real economy 
when wages and prices are sticky.  The monetary authorities need to know how to act 
in these circumstances, and to do so quickly.  In the face of a need for liquidity, they 
must inject the appropriate amount of monetary base into the system to keep the 
money supply growing at its normal rate given the different ratios now prevailing. 
 
Financial crisis in Britain in 1931? 
 
At the beginning of the 1930s, against the background of growing international 
economic and political tensions, the British economy and some financial institutions 
experienced various problems.  These included currency crisis and abandonment of 
the gold standard, payment difficulties of international borrowers, especially those in 
Germany and other central European countries, and struggling domestic borrowers in 
traditional industries.  The idea of a financial crisis in Britain in 1931 first entered the 
economic history literature with an article which confused the different elements of 
crises and labelled them ‘financial crisis’ (Williams, 1963).  It is still sometimes 
asserted that there was such a crisis, no doubt partly because financial crises were 
experienced in many other countries and ‘financial crises ricochet from one country to 
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another’ (Kindleberger & Aliber, 2005, p. 124).  We contend there was no ‘financial’ 
or ‘banking’ crisis in Britain in 1931, a view shared by others (for example, 
Grossman, 1994; Jonker & van Zanden, 1995; Kindleberger & Aliber, 2005; Reinhart 
& Rogoff, 2009). 
 
The problems of the 1930s affected the different types of British banking 
institution to different degrees.  Some merchant banks and British-owned banks 
operating overseas (‘British overseas banks’) were particularly hard-hit, but the 
principal commercial banks, the joint-stock clearing banks, proved to be sound.   This 
group of institutions, small in number but of key importance, were the country’s 
largest financial institutions and the core of the payments system.  Their performance 
in the twentieth century has been subject to many criticisms, many of these unjustified 
or exaggerated.  Underlying the debate on their role is an implicit trade-off between 
stability and risk-taking.  We argue that at a time when many of the developed world’s 
banks were in difficulty these banks were in a position of relative strength.  This 
contributed greatly to the stability of Britain’s financial system and its economy, still a 
leading economy in the interwar period, with an important, albeit weakened, currency. 
 
 
Britain and its banking system 
 
The interwar British economy 
 
The picture often presented of interwar Britain is one of unremitting gloom - deflation, 
exchange-rate shame, the General Strike, unemployment, the Jarrow March, and other 
such features.  Space precludes a comprehensive assessment, but in aggregate the 
British economy performed well in the interwar period (Crafts, 2004).  After the First 
World War boom GDP per capita fell, but reached its 1913 level again in the mid-
1920s.  The next peak in 1929 was followed by recession, but Britain suffered no 
Great Depression.  Output fell significantly in just one year (1931) and was static in 
two others between 1929 and 1932, with an overall fall in GDP per capita of around 
7½% from the peak.  GDP per capita then rose by more than 22% from its 1931 level 
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in the strongest-ever upswing in British economic history between 1932 and 1937 
(Feinstein, 1976, Table 17).  The 1930s was the decade of ring roads and ‘interwar 
semis’, a huge construction boom and growth in ‘new industries’. 
 
Unemployment rose sharply from around 1 million in the 1920s to peak at 
around 3 million, then fell quite quickly as economic growth rose sharply in the 
1930s, although significant regional variations remained (Hatton, 2004, p. 350, Table 
13.1).  This unemployment is explained best in terms of rising real wages, the 
consequence of falling prices, fixed labour contracts, and changes in the benefit 
system, which encouraged the supply of labour and dampened the demand for it 
(Beenstock, Capie, & Griffiths, 1984).  The principal explanation for the good 
performance after 1932 was the abandonment of the gold standard, generally 
experienced by countries which abandoned (Bernanke & James, 1991), and the 
resulting freedom to use monetary policy flexibly, with low interest rates from 1932.  
This all took place in the face of collapsing international trade to which the British 
economy was more exposed than most. 
 
Capie, Mills, & Wood (1986) showed that there was no ‘real financial crisis’ 
in 1931, although Sterling suffered an exchange-rate crisis as the pound was forced off 
the gold standard and the exchange rate declined precipitately in the closing months of 
that year.  The restoration of the gold standard in 1925 had been unsatisfactory in 
terms of the various rates adopted by different countries in the following few years.  
The pound was overvalued and pressure mounted on Sterling through the summer of 
1931, in large part due to the decline in the capital account of the balance of payments 
and weak government finances, which led to political crisis and the formation of the 
National Government (Eichengreen, 1992, pp. 279-285; Williamson, 1992).  Reserves 
were insufficient to sustain the fixed rate without the support of damagingly high 
interest rates, and the link with gold was broken in September after it became clear 
that the parity could not be defended.   
 
The Bank of England’s lender of last resort role and the commercial banks 
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The risk of financial crisis, which would endanger the commercial banks and the 
payments system, could be averted by appropriate LLR action.  In Britain, the Bank 
was a mature LLR, a role slowly learned in a favourable legislative period and near-to-
ideal institutional setting in the course of the nineteenth century (Capie, 2002).  When 
banks learned that they could always access liquidity they were less inclined to panic 
as the Bank could inject liquidity as soon as its carefully-attuned antennae detected 
fears of illiquidity.  The operation of the discount houses as a buffer between banks 
and the Bank allowed anonymity to prevail and prevented special pleading, very much 
in line with the mood of that time in keeping special interests at a distance.  The gold 
standard was a complicating factor, as the monetary base was determined via the 
balance of payments.  The solution would be to suspend the gold standard when there 
was the risk of a financial crisis, and supply all the cash needed to satisfy demand.  
This could be done only where the supplying institution had strong credibility, as the 
Bank achieved in the nineteenth century, when there was almost complete trust in the 
system and appreciation of its workings.  These arrangements contributed to the 
remarkable stability of the British financial system from the 1870s to the late 
twentieth century.  There was no ‘real financial crisis’ after 1866, although the Bank 
provided liquidity as LLR on occasions when fear made an appearance.  The British 
system remained stable even when other countries suffered financial crises, such as in 
1873 or 1907.  So in 1929-31 the banking system understood how the Bank would 
behave if panic began to appear - the Bank could supply the markets with all the 
liquidity needed at an appropriate rate of interest. 
 
The commercial banking system evolved into a highly concentrated one as the 
Bank’s role became more clearly defined and understood.  By 1920 the five largest 
banks dominated.  The ‘Big Five’ were all London-based, held about 80% of all 
deposits and had around 10,000 branches.  They had learned prudence, were well-
diversified across the country geographically and across all sectors of the economy, 
and had shifted to more liquid asset structures (Collins & Baker, 2001, 2003), which 
allowed capital ratios to fall.  This system has been subject to long-standing criticisms 
that the banks were too conservative and failed to:  lend to new, small and deserving 
businesses or to risky ventures; provide long-term capital to support industry; promote 
industrial restructuring; and charge competitive lending rates or pay competitive 
 8 
deposit rates.  Additionally the banks are argued to have held excessive amounts of 
government debt, demanded unreasonable security from borrowers, and used their 
‘cartel’ to enjoy a quiet and comfortable life. 
 
The banks could claim that their role in the provision of finance was expected 
to be a limited one, but criticisms have persisted, partly due to the banks’ failure to 
contradict them.  For example, the banks were so keen to preserve their reputation for 
sound finance that in their evidence to the 1931 Macmillan Committee they accepted 
that they did not lend on anything other than a short-term basis, for anything other 
than working capital.  Many studies have shown these criticisms and the contrasts 
often made to other countries, particularly in continental Europe, to be exaggerated 
(for fuller discussion of these issues, see, for example, Ackrill & Hannah, 2001, pp. 
93-5; Baker & Collins, 2010; Collins, 1998; Newton, 2003; Ross, 1996). 
 
Central European problems in 1931 and the German Standstill 
 
If there was no financial crisis in Britain in 1931, was the banking system nevertheless 
at risk?  James argues that it was threatened by the exposures of those British 
merchant banks closely linked to continental Europe to the severe liquidity and 
solvency problems which developed rapidly there in the first half of 1931, a theme 
recently revisited by Accominotti (2009).  The May 1931 insolvency of Credit Anstalt, 
Austria’s largest bank but poorly managed in the 1920s, quickly shifted attention to 
the closely-connected German universal banks.  One of the six large banks, the 
Darmstädter-und Nationalbank (Danat), failed due to its large exposure to the textile 
company Nordwolle.  The Berlin Great Banks operated on very low cash and reserve 
ratios, and their total assets and liquidity declined further in June and July 1931 as 
panic spread and depositors, including those from overseas on whom they relied 
heavily, withdrew their funds (Eichengreen, 1992, pp. 261-279; Kindleberger, 1986, 
pp. 144-159; Kindleberger & Aliber, 2005, pp. 258-262).  The Reichsbank, with 
limited experience as a central bank, failed to behave as the LLR, and to lend freely to 
the market, although given the practices of the universal banking system and the size 
of the leading banks it was difficult for it to act (Capie, Mills, & Wood, 1986). 
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The German banks’ difficulties and the country’s international payment 
position, against the wider background of World War One reparations and political, 
economic and social problems, led to a partial moratorium covering much of its 
international debt.  The six-month September 1931 German Credit Agreement (‘the 
German Standstill’), renewed annually from 1932, formalised the position of short-
term debt, much of which arose from trade finance.  Approximately £54 million was 
initially due to British creditors, around one-third of this to the clearing banks.  The 
smaller merchant banks accounted for most of the remainder, and were therefore 
proportionately much more heavily exposed (Accominotti, 2009).  The international 
debts of Austria and Hungary were subject to similar arrangements, although British 
exposures to these were a small fraction of the German Standstill exposures.
1
 
 
German business was a mainstay for the merchant banks with European 
origins - ‘... family enterprises linked to much of the rest of the world by “separate” 
family firms in other countries’ (Kobrak, 2009, p. 53).  These firms included 
Kleinworts and Schroders, which had the largest German Standstill exposures - 
respectively three times the partners’ capital (Diaper, 1986, p. 68), and approximately 
1.3 times partners’ capital and bad debt reserves (Roberts, 1992, p. 264).  Others with 
large exposures included Lazards (Forbes, 2000, p. 40), but not all were so heavily-
exposed - Morgan Grenfell, for example, had largely avoided private German business 
(Burk, 1989, p. 85).  The Bank, with the Treasury’s approval, took the lead role in 
ensuring British banks remained engaged in the Standstill.  It exercised ‘moral 
suasion’, asking commercial banks to provide sufficient support to their merchant 
bank customers to allow them to continue in business (Roberts, 1992, pp. 252-253, 
266). 
 
 Seen by some as economic appeasement, but by others as pragmatism or 
resigned realism, the Standstill arrangements represented a compromise between 
political and financial interests - a means to maintain credit lines to Britain’s largest 
trading partner, to facilitate trade, and sustain economic relations and encourage 
economic stability in Germany, thereby protecting the creditors’ interests against the 
collapse in international trade and rising protectionism and political tensions (Forbes, 
1987, 2000).  The result was that British bankers appeared less aggressive than many 
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German Standstill creditors in reducing their exposures.  By 1939 total credit lines 
extended by British-based creditors had increased from 24% to 57% of the overall 
total outstanding, which had fallen considerably (Forbes, 2000, p. 193, Tables 7 and 
8).  But, generally, British bankers accepted the Standstill reluctantly, fearing that the 
alternatives, such as a complete moratorium, the use of clearing arrangements, or 
extracting themselves with considerable losses, were worse (Forbes, 1987, p. 586; 
Kynaston, 1999, pp. 434-435).  Ultimate repayment came only after the 1952 
Lancaster House conference secured a comprehensive settlement of Germany’s pre-
World War Two debts, including long-term debts, much of which were owed to US 
creditors. 
 
 
The resilience of British commercial banks in the 1930s 
 
What evidence is there to support our contention that Britain’s major commercial or 
clearing banks demonstrated resilience during the 1930s?   Data from secondary 
sources combined with new archival material provide a reasonably clear picture, but 
variations in the operations of different banks and the inevitable vagaries in the 
survival of archival data mean that the same information is not available for all 
institutions. 
 
Clearing banks’ support for the Bank 
 
The large clearing banks neither needed nor received support from the Bank.  Table 1 
summarises a number of support operations of various types in the period, the 
existence and details of which have usually only become known subsequently.  The 
Bank often played a leading role, and virtually all these operations related to merchant 
banks or British overseas banks.  The notable exception was Williams Deacon’s, the 
small Manchester-based clearing bank with a heavy concentration of lending to the 
cotton industry.  Its takeover by the Royal Bank of Scotland was engineered by the 
Bank, which met those losses which arose prior to the takeover.  The Bank bore the 
bulk of losses from the identified operations, which totalled around £8 million (a little 
over £400 million at end-2009 prices) from Anglo International, Anglo-South 
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American Bank (ASAB), Huths, and Williams Deacon’s.  The clearing banks also 
incurred some losses.  Their involvement in such operations was not new; they had, 
for example, joined together under the leadership of the Midland Bank and the Bank 
to support the Yorkshire Penny Bank in 1911 (Holmes & Green, 1986, pp. 143-147).  
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
The clearing banks also assisted the Bank’s efforts to support Sterling.  
Barclays entered into an exchange with the Bank, receiving British government 
Treasury bills for commercial bills, which the Bank then used as security for its 
August 1931 loan of £25 million from the Bank of France (Tuke & Gillman, 1972, p. 
31).  At the request of the Bank the banks also participated in a scheme in the forward 
foreign exchange market, and at one of the smaller clearing banks ‘... the General 
Manager reported that forward [US] dollars and [French] francs had been sold for 
account of the Bank of England to the extent of £1,700,000’.2  This operation 
involved about £20 million of forward sales (Sayers, 1976, pp. 408-409), not 
insubstantial compared to the Bank’s gold and foreign exchange holdings of £141 
million at 30 December 1931 (Sayers, 1976, Vol. 3, Appendix 37, p. 355), or total UK 
reserves at the same date, including Treasury holdings, of £210 million (Howson, 
1980, p. 80, Table 3). 
 
Capital flight from Britain and bank deposits 
 
We noted earlier the reliance of German banks on short-term international deposits.  
Short-term foreign capital was withdrawn from London during the 1931 exchange-rate 
crisis (see, for example, James, 1992, pp. 602-603; James, 2001, pp. 71-72; and 
Williams, 1963, pp. 525-528).  Some of this capital flight represented withdrawal of 
bank deposits, but it is also believed that foreign holdings of securities were 
liquidated.  Estimates of capital outflows are problematic, with contradictory 
accounts, both as to the identity of the sellers of Sterling and the amounts involved.  
Although detailed data on foreign depositors’ funds at the clearing banks are not 
available to reconcile the various accounts, the available data do indicate that major 
British banks were much less reliant on international deposits, did not suffer 
withdrawals on the same scale, and remained much more liquid. 
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The clearing banks’ aggregate deposits fell by around £125 million in calendar 
year 1931, but by only 4% from June to September (Capie & Webber, 1985, pp. 437, 
444, Table III.(4) ).  Deposits of the Big Five, with stronger London bias to their 
business, fell more sharply than those of the smaller clearing banks and the Scottish 
banks (Table 2).  Deposits of the merchant banks were small in relative terms, but ‘the 
acceptance houses had £105 millions of deposits, nearly all of foreign origin’ at the 
end of 1930 and lost about 40% of these (Truptil, 1936, p. 314).  Deposits in the 
British overseas banks, typically with distinct geographical biases to their activities, 
did not generally decline more than those of the clearing banks.  The exception was 
ASAB, whose deposits contracted sharply, reflecting the fears for its future which 
forced the Bank to organise a major and long-running support operation (see above).  
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
New archival data for weekly deposit balances throughout 1931 for two 
clearing banks, one large (Westminster) and one small (District), suggest that 
variations during the year were not particularly wide (Table 3), although 
Westminster’s deposit balances touched their minimum immediately after gold 
standard suspension.  In Table 4 we report monthly averages of aggregate deposits for 
the clearing banks in 1931 and in the five years before and after.  The range of 
variation in 1931 was wider than in some years, and the levels of deposits in 
September and October 1931 a little lower than typical for these months, but the 
overall data do not indicate major deposit losses around the time of exit from the gold 
standard.  [INSERT TABLES 3 AND 4] 
 
Limited archival evidence from Westminster Bank implies that withdrawals of 
deposits placed by foreign customers with the clearing banks would have represented 
only a small proportion of short-term capital outflows in 1931: 
 
When five years ago, England [sic] went off gold, we had approximately £20 
millions of sterling balances from customers domiciled abroad ... by September 1934, 
such balances were reduced to £17¼ millions ... now the Foreign Sterling Balances 
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are at the record figure of £31½ millions ... This Bank habitually holds more than one 
fifth of the Foreign Balances deposited with the eleven Clearing Banks.
3
 
 
Foreign currency deposits at the Westminster were small.  US dollar deposits and 
loans were roughly equal at approximately $11 million at 31 October 1927.  When 
German payments were suspended there was a mismatch, very small in relation to the 
overall balance sheet, with approximately $14 million in deposits and $5 million in 
loans at 13 July 1931, reduced to $10.5 million and $3 million respectively by 7 
September 1931.
4
 
 
Asset structures 
 
The clearing banks’ aggregate balance sheets for 1930 and 1931 suggest that 
their deployments of assets were not notably different from earlier decades (see Table 
5), although higher proportions of the ‘bills discounted’ and ‘investments’ categories 
were represented by British government debt.  In the ‘crisis year’ of 1931, the clearing 
banks remained sufficiently liquid to maintain normal business.  Despite rumours in 
May 1931 in the New York market that it was in difficulty (James, 2001, p. 71), 
archival data show that Barclays continued to make large advances to a wide range of 
customers before and after the German Standstill and abandonment of the gold 
standard.
5
  A similar picture of ‘business as normal’ can be found in the approvals 
given by Lloyds’ Board of Directors.6  The major change in the clearing banks’ asset 
structures occurred in 1932 - advances fell in absolute and relative terms, offset by the 
rise in investments, which consisted almost wholly of British government securities 
(see Table 5).  At every year-end from 1932 to 1939 investments represented between 
31% and 33% of total assets and advances ranged from 33% to 37%.  [INSERT 
TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
Profitability and capital 
 
Previous studies such as Grossman (1994) and Jonker & van Zanden (1995) relied on 
published data for the profits and capital of British banks.  In this period the banks 
were not obliged to publish their ‘true’ positions, which they obscured by various 
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means, the most important of which was ‘hidden reserves’.  The banks used these to 
smooth fluctuations in performance over the business cycle to help present a picture of 
strength and stability (Billings & Capie, 2009).  In a recession, when profits were 
relatively low, they would draw from hidden reserves to report higher profits and at 
the peak, when profits were relatively high, they would add to hidden reserves, 
reporting lower profits. 
 
Returns on capital measured using ‘true’ profits and capital figures were rather 
more volatile than those the banks published, but, on average, did not deviate 
dramatically from their reported positions (Capie & Billings, 2001, pp. 380-381, 
Tables 2 and 3).  Overall the 1930s were less profitable than the 1920s and later 
decades, except for the Midland Bank, and it was a very rare event for any clearing 
bank to make a loss on a ‘true’ basis.  Predictably, advances were the most profitable 
asset category (Capie & Billings, 2004).  Investments were also profitable, and the 
policy of ‘cheap money’ from 1932 provided some banks with a useful cushion of 
unrealised profits on investments (Billings & Capie, 2007, p. 151, Table 7).  Published 
financial statements consistently understated the strength of clearing banks’ capital 
positions due to significant hidden reserves (Billings & Capie, 2007, pp. 150-151, 
Table 6).  Calculations based on archival data indicate that ‘true’ capital ratios 
deteriorated to some extent through the 1930s, with variations from bank to bank 
(Table 6).  But declines were not sharp, and arguably, given the fall in advances, lower 
capital ratios were appropriate.  [INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
 
Bad debts 
 
Archival sources yield new data on the clearing banks’ experiences of bad debts 
during the interwar period.  Three measures are presented in Table 7 where data 
permit: total bad debt provisions, being the total amount set aside against bad debts at 
the year-end as a percentage of year-end advances; the annual bad debt charge, being 
the net new provisions for bad debts as a percentage of year-end advances (negative 
figures indicate that provisions no longer required exceeded new provisions); and the 
annual bad debt write-offs, the total amount of bad debts written off in the year as a 
percentage of year-end advances.  Total provisions are almost invariably a multiple of 
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the annual charge or write-offs, as banks usually maintain for some time provisions 
against those debts which they consider might ‘go bad’, before actually writing off the 
unrecovered debts.  Bad debt provisions are not treated as part of capital in the capital 
ratios we report in Table 6, so over-provision for bad debts, whether simply 
misjudgement of the possibility of loss, or deliberate over-provision out of a sense of 
prudence, could be considered additional capital (see Ackrill & Hannah, 2001, pp, 
448-450, for discussion of issues in the measurement of bad debts).  [INSERT 
TABLE 7 HERE] 
 
Overall, the data do not suggest a marked deterioration in bad debt experience 
from the 1920s to the 1930s, and reflect levels of bad debt which would be considered 
low by international comparisons.  Although total provisions expressed as a 
percentage of advances were worse in the 1930s, falls in advances exaggerate this 
apparent deterioration.  New provisions for bad debts were generally lower in the 
1930s than in the 1920s, and actual write-offs similar for Barclays, the only bank for 
which records of write-offs in both decades survive.  The reported data include 
provisions and write-offs for German Standstill debt, and the unusually high 1939 
write-off for Barclays reflects its write-off of Standstill debt.   
 
The clearing banks, in common with the merchant and British overseas banks, 
were not a homogenous group, and the diversity of operations within the sector can be 
considered a stabilising factor.  Barclays, with significant operations in its 
international subsidiary, Barclays DCO, showed different bad debt experience in its 
domestic and international operations (Ackrill & Hannah, 2001, p. 451), suggesting 
some benefit from diversification.  The Midland and Lloyds banks provide additional 
examples. 
 
The Midland’s exposures to British trade and industry were greater than those 
of other banks, and by 1930 it already had ‘... a particularly heavy concentration [of 
doubtful or bad debts] in the textile industry, coal, iron and steel, and in stockbroking 
and the commodity trades’ (Holmes & Green, 1986, pp. 179 and 189).   Its exposure 
to the Royal Mail Shipping Group, through its Belfast Bank subsidiary, was £3.4 
million, roughly equivalent to its initial German Standstill exposure (Holmes & 
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Green, 1986, p. 185).  But the Midland suffered few problems from international 
business, having pursued a different strategy from the other Big Five banks.  It had no 
subsidiary or branch operations outside Britain, but its London-based overseas branch, 
with an extensive correspondent network, was consistently profitable (Holmes and 
Green, 1986, p. 165). 
 
In contrast, Lloyds’ exposure to heavy industry was relatively low.  For 
example, advances to collieries in July 1931 amounted to only £1.43 million, less than 
0.4% of assets.
7
  But Lloyds had relatively large indirect exposures to South America 
and Europe through subsidiaries or associates which it was forced to support.  It 
owned 57% of the Bank of London and South America (BOLSA) in the early 1930s, 
diluted to below 50% after BOLSA’s 1936 merger with ASAB, and declined to 
participate in the support operation for ASAB due to its interest in BOLSA (Jones, 
1993, pp. 140, 241).  Lloyds’ 10%, £100,000, shareholding in British Italian 
Corporation generated a loss of more than ten times its original investment (Jones, 
1993, pp. 231-234; Table 4).  An equal partner in Lloyds and National Provincial 
Foreign Bank, with its head office in Paris and most of its operations in France, 
Lloyds shared in providing support of £1.5 million by the outbreak of World War 
Two, representing approximately 10% of the joint venture’s total assets at November 
1935.
8
 
 
The clearing banks pursued various approaches to manage their Standstill 
debts by: bringing non-Standstill German exposures within Standstill arrangements; 
taking steps to minimise currency losses from exchange-rate volatility after 
breakdown of the gold standard; and bringing exposures of their international 
subsidiaries within parent bank arrangements.  Some banks realised losses to reduce 
Standstill exposures, but others allowed the Standstill to take its course, and being 
well-capitalised could afford to do so.  Archival data show that the exposures of 
Lloyds and National Provincial banks to Standstill debt were lower than those of the 
other large clearing banks, and the declines in their exposures between 1931 and 1939 
reflected greater willingness to accept losses in reducing these (see Table 8).  
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE]  
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Discussion and conclusion 
 
Controversies continue over the causes of banking failure and financial crises in the 
1930s.  We do not set out in this article to explain experience in countries other than 
Britain in the interwar years, but it is appropriate to reflect on the various factors put 
forward to explain variations in experience from country to country.  These include 
differences between universal and specialised banking systems, but ‘... neither “bank-
oriented” nor “market-oriented” financial systems escaped the crisis; and it is not easy 
to say which system proved the more resilient’ (Tilly, 1998, p. 23).  It is, however, 
clear that universal banking could produce bad outcomes as, for example, in Italy, 
where ‘connected lending’ resulted in poor lending decisions and weak monitoring 
(Battilossi, 2009). 
 
The question of branch versus unit banking may be another important factor.  
Branching is generally thought to offer benefits such as greater diversification, 
resilience to shocks, and ease of co-ordination (Calomiris, 2010).  In Britain and 
Canada, large branch networks were a stabilising factor (Bordo, Rockoff, & Redish, 
1994; Grossman, 1994).  But evidence on branch banking elsewhere, including in 
Germany and the US, is not clear-cut, with the effects of branching on competition 
and risk-taking behaviour difficult to disentangle (Carlson, 2004; Schnabel, 2009). 
 
Many have argued that central bank policies were inadequate, with the German 
Reichsbank and the US Federal Reserve (‘the Fed’) notable examples.  Richardson 
(2007, pp. 643-644) summarises the contrasting views on the Fed’s role in the Great 
Depression.  Its failure to inject sufficient high-powered money to offset the reduction 
in the money stock may have allowed the normal US business cycle to turn into the 
Great Depression (Bordo, Choudhri, & Schwartz, 2002; Friedman & Schwartz, 1963).  
James is unconvinced: ‘... the Friedman and Schwartz account is inadequate ... their 
argument is somewhat slippery as to causality ...’ (James, 2001, pp. 76-77).  One 
possible answer is the vulnerability of banks that cleared cheques via correspondents 
to the collapse of correspondent networks.  With widespread unit banking, clearing 
houses played a prominent role and provided a route by which contagion could be 
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spread, which the Fed failed to offset (Richardson, 2007).  Richardson & Van Horn 
(2009) demonstrate that failures of banks in New York City, the centre of the US 
money market, resulted from increased regulatory scrutiny rather than contagion from 
European problems.  Calomiris (2010) also rejects the judgement that panic or 
international contagion contributed to significant bank failures in the US, but is 
critical of the view that the Fed failed, drawing attention to sector-specific and 
regional shocks, magnified by the extent of unit banking. 
 
Overall, we suggest that structural weaknesses found in banking systems 
elsewhere, such as the absence of an effective LOLR, poor governance, the 
dependence of the main commercial banks on overseas deposits, and the prevalence of 
unit banking, were absent from Britain.  Other factors present in Britain, such as 
strong liquidity and capital positions, were missing elsewhere.  These features were 
reinforced by the crucial decision to depart from the gold standard, which protected 
the real economy from undue suffering, allowing Britain to enjoy its strongest-ever 
upswing from 1932-7, after a recession (not depression) in 1929-32.  Britain’s escape 
from the nonmonetary effects identified by Bernanke (1983) helped to ensure that the 
banking system did not suffer cripplingly high levels of bad debt.  To follow the 
taxonomy of Reinhart & Rogoff (2009), Britain suffered a currency crisis, but avoided 
the banking, debt and inflation crises which often accompany this. 
 
The financial system experienced contagion, notably from capital flight by 
overseas investors during the 1931 exchange-rate crisis, although evidence on the 
nature and extent of this is unsatisfactory.  But evidence of a ‘run’ on British banks is 
lacking, the system emerged intact, and we argue was not under serious threat, thereby 
contributing to the financial and monetary stability which underpin macroeconomic 
stability.  This argument is not new, but the new archival data we present enhance the 
range and quality of evidence available, and therefore provide more comprehensive 
support for this view than has been recognised previously. 
 
The increased concentration arising from the amalgamation process which 
created the Big Five clearing banks had produced powerful and resilient institutions, 
able to absorb the external shocks of abandonment of the gold standard and the 
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Standstill, at a time when severe banking problems were found in many other 
countries.  The Big Five proved sound: they were strongly capitalised and none 
needed to raise new capital in the 1930s; they had large branch networks and strong 
earning power; there were no mergers between them or with other banks; and their 
diversified and liquid balance sheets contrasted, for example, to their German 
counterparts.  These were not universal banks and their much-criticised conservatism 
and prudence, albeit overstated, helped them to avoid the fate of banks elsewhere, and 
to ensure that this concentrated banking structure delivered stability. 
 
The British banks which experienced serious problems in the 1930s were those 
which were smaller and more specialised than the large clearing banks and whose 
business was relatively undiversified: small clearing banks with large exposures to the 
Lancashire cotton industry; merchant banks, whose main business was the financing 
of international trade, much of it Anglo-German; and some British overseas banks, 
particularly those with heavy dependence on Latin America.  Several merchant banks 
experienced both liquidity and solvency problems, the result of substantial Standstill 
debt, high leverage, and heavy reliance on foreign deposits.  They were effectively 
insolvent, kept afloat by a mixture of owners’ capital, funding from the large clearing 
banks and the Bank, mergers, and changes to market practice. 
 
The Bank used its full range of powers and persuasion in its active, discreet, 
and highly discriminatory, support of individual institutions.  It often co-opted the 
large clearing banks into support operations, and the existence of this small group of 
strong, ‘well-behaved’ institutions greatly assisted it.  Overall, the results were 
consolidation around the periphery of the clearing banks, but with more fundamental 
change among the merchant banks and discount houses.  The collapse of individual 
institutions, while not a threat to the British financial system as a whole, would have 
disrupted the London discount market, still the world’s major money market.  This 
would have damaged the status of the City of London as a financial centre, and also 
British trade, already under pressure from rising trade barriers and falling economic 
activity in many countries.  Thus the Bank acted in its traditional way, fulfilling a role 
of the type envisaged by Kindleberger & Aliber (2005, p. 292): ‘Domestic lenders of 
last resort have been established to enhance the stability of the financial system 
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although not necessarily of individual financial banks’.  However, the Bank did not 
make a conscious choice to support particular institutions at the expense of 
abandoning the gold standard.  Circumstances meant that the exchange rate was no 
longer sustainable, but liquidity could be provided to the system.   
 
In the late 2000s crisis hit a highly concentrated British domestic banking 
system which was threatened by contagion from international problems.  There are 
notable contrasts to the 1930s, when the major commercial banks had adequate capital 
resources and liquidity, whereas in the 2000s less well-diversified institutions had 
abandoned robust liquidity positions for alternative models.  In the 1930s prudent 
institutions were able and willing to participate in the Bank’s support operations for 
other financial institutions and in its attempts to maintain the gold standard.  This took 
place within an institutional framework in which there was less transparency than 
today and detailed rules-based regulation was absent. 
 
We suggest that the 1930s provide an important lesson looking forward.  
Market concentration in the banking sector may be undesirable from the perspectives 
of competition and the provision of finance.  But within such a system large, well-
diversified, and prudent banks, supported by active central banking and the flexibility 
of a floating exchange rate regime, were able to avoid panic, escaped the need for ‘fire 
sales’ of problem assets, and could sustain their capital positions.  For smaller, 
weaker, banks, the existence and effective operation of formal or informal 
mechanisms ensured that their problems could be managed within this system. 
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Table 1: Support operations in British banking, 1927-39 
 
 date amount of 
support (£000s) 
amount of 
loss (£000s) 
support provided/loss 
suffered by 
source 
      
Anglo International Bank 1927-43 1,000 1,600 BoE Jones, 1993, pp. 230-231 
      
Anglo-South American Bank 
1 
1931-6 5,000-8,500 4,568, of 
which BoE 
2,351 
800 
c. 500 
c. 500 
BoE and Big Five excluding 
Lloyds  
 
Westminster 
Barclays) 
Midland) 
Jones, 1993, pp. 240-242; Sayers, 1976, 
pp. 263-267 
 
RBSGA, WES/1177/96 
Holmes & Green, 1986, p. 186 
      
Banca Italo-Britannica/British-Italian 
Corporation 
1929-30 5,100 
 
 
 
250 
3,861 to 
5,347 
1,080 
 
250 
 
Lloyds, National Provincial, 
Westminster 
Lloyds 
 
BoE 
 
Jones, 1993, pp. 231-234 
 
Winton, 1982, pp. 57-9; LGA, Winton 
research file ‘Investments’ 
Sayers, 1976, pp. 261-262 
 
      
British Overseas Bank 
2 
1938 1,000 
750 
250 
300 BoE) 
National Provincial) 
Union Bank of Scotland) 
Jones, 1993, pp. 243-244 
 
 
   
 
c. 400 William’s Deacons William’s Deacons, 1971, p. 161 
Cox & Co. 
3 
1929 900 BoE 
guarantees 
267 BoE Jones, 1993, p. 240; Sayers, 1976, p. 242 
      
Glyn, Mills 
4 
1939 - - -  
      
Hambros (A) 1932 100 - BoE Kynaston, 1999, p. 359; Sayers, 1976, p. 
531 
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 date amount of 
support (£000s) 
amount of 
loss (£000s) 
support provided/loss 
suffered by 
source 
Higginson & Co. (A) 1932 340 - BoE Kynaston, 1999, p. 360; Sayers, 1976, p. 
531 
      
F. Huth & Co. (A) 
2 
early 1930s - 1,000 BoE Jones, 1993, pp. 243-244; Sayers, 1976, p. 
270 
      
Kleinwort, Sons & Co. (A) 1931 
 
1939 
3,250 (repaid by 
Sept. 1932) 
1,000 (repaid 
1940) 
- 
 
- 
Westminster 
 
Westminster 
Diaper, 1986, p. 69 
 
Diaper, 1986, p. 71 
      
Lazard (A): fraud in Brussels office July 1931 3,500 (repaid over 
seven years) 
6,000 BoE) 
Lazard) 
Kynaston, 1999, p. 228; Sayers, 1976, pp. 
530-531 
Lazard (A): ‘problems in Paris’ 1932 2,000  in equal shares: BoE and 
National Provincial 
Kynaston, 1999, p. 360 
      
Lloyds and National Provincial Foreign 
Bank 
1931-9 1,500 guarantees/ 
payments to 
recapitalise 
- Lloyds, National Provincial RBSGA, LBI/14/2072; Jones, 1993, p. 143 
      
J. Henry Schröder & Co. (A) 1936 
1939 
1,000 (repaid) 
1,000 
- 
- 
Westminster 
 
Roberts, 1992, p. 266 
      
Williams Deacon’s 5 1929-38 4,000 max. 3,212 BoE Sayers, 1976, p. 258 
      
 
Notes: 
 
Big Five = Barclays, Lloyds, Midland, National Provincial and Westminster banks 
BoE = Bank of England 
A = member of the Accepting Houses’ Committee of merchant banks 
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1 = merged with Bank of London and South America in 1936 
2 = F. Huth & Co. taken over by British Overseas Bank in 1936 
3 = taken over by Lloyds 1929 
4 = taken over by Royal Bank of Scotland in 1939 
5 = taken over by Royal Bank of Scotland in 1930; losses to BoE reflect losses on pre-takeover lending by Williams Deacon’s 
 
‘Support’ usually took the form of loans. 
 
For comparison, when the City of Glasgow Bank failed in 1878, the shortfall to the shareholders with unlimited liability was £5.2 million 
(Collins, 1989, p. 504), equivalent to £9.1 million at 1931 prices and £471 million at end-2009 prices.  £1 million in 1931 is equivalent to 
approximately £52 million at end-2009. 
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Table 2: Banks’ deposits at financial year-end dates, 1930-2 
 
 deposits 
(£m) 
index of deposits, 1930 
=100 
 
Big Five clearing banks 1930 1930 1931 1932 
Barclays 347.9 100 96 109 
Lloyds 364.6 100 92 105 
Midland 399.6 100 90 105 
National Provincial 291.5 100 90 100 
Westminster 291.6 100 93 102 
     
other main commercial banks    
District 52.4 100 96 108 
Martins 78.6 100 97 109 
Williams Deacon’s 32.0 100 91 106 
     
Scottish banks    
Bank of Scotland 32.3 100 101 96 
Clydesdale 30.2 100 93 106 
Royal Bank of Scotland 50.4 100 98 111  
     
British overseas banks     
Anglo-South American 49.8 100 82 51 
Bank of Australasia 34.2 100 107 111 
Bank of London and South America 39.4 100 87 105 
Barclays DCO 62.7 100 109 114 
Chartered 40.8 100 95 107 
Hongkong 50.6 100 110 115 
     
merchant banks     
Baring Brothers & Co. 17.6 100 100 99 
Erlangers 4.1 100 30 41 
Hambros 18.4 100 58 58 
S. Japhet & Co. 6.2 100 37 32 
J. Henry Schröder & Co. 8.8 100 50 38 
     
aggregate data    
UK banks 2,396.0 100 93 105 
Joint stock banks of England and Wales 1,976.8 100 92 104 
London clearing banks 1,903.4 100 92 104 
London clearing banks, average of monthly statements 1,801.0 100 98 99 
 
Sources: authors calculations.  Bank of Scotland: Saville, 1996, p. 962, Table A8; 
Clydesdale Bank: Munn, 1988, p. 340; British overseas banks: Jones, 1993, Appendix 
5; merchant banks except Schroders: Truptil, 1936, pp. 336-337, 339, Appendices III 
and V; Schroders: Roberts, 1992, p. 530, Appendix IV (i); other banks: annual reports; 
aggregate data: Sheppard, 1971: pp. 116-119, Tables (A) 1.1, 1.2, pp. 130-133, Tables 
(A) 1.8, 1.9, pp. 138-139, Table (A) 1.13. 
 
Notes: 
 
‘Deposits’ represents ‘Deposit and other accounts’ at financial year-end dates, except 
for ‘average of monthly statements’ for London clearing banks.  The financial year-
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end date is 31 December for all banks except: Anglo-South American (31 October); 
Bank of Australasia (30 June); Barclays DCO and Bank of London and South 
America (30 September); Hambros (31 March in following year); Hongkong (31 
August); Royal Bank of Scotland (11 October 1930, 10 October 1931, 8 October 
1932). 
 
 
Table 3: Fluctuations in weekly deposits, Westminster and District banks, 1931 
 
 Westminster District 
annual average 100 100 
standard deviation 3.41 2.79 
minimum 95.02 95.67 
maximum 109.92 108.16 
date of minimum 24 September 1931 8 April 1931 
date of maximum 1 January 1931 21 January 1931 
 
data are summarised for ‘Deposits and other accounts’ 
 
Source: authors’ calculations from weekly balance sheet data, RBSGA, WES/561 and 
DIS/102 
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Table 4: Fluctuation in aggregate deposits of London clearing banks, 1926-36 
 
 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 mean 
January 100.6 101.1 101.0 102.6 100.2 106.4 95.9 101.6 102.1 99.2 97.7 100.8 
February 98.7 98.7 98.2 100.8 97.3 103.4 92.8 100.3 100.3 97.8 95.8 98.5 
March 97.6 97.5 96.8 98.7 95.5 100.2 93.8 98.6 97.3 96.2 95.1 97.0 
April 97.8 98.0 97.8 98.9 97.2 98.6 94.1 98.9 98.5 97.1 97.2 97.6 
May 97.7 98.5 97.7 98.3 98.8 98.7 95.1 99.6 98.8 98.1 98.6 98.2 
June 100.2 100.5 100.1 100.4 101.4 101.2 98.8 101.3 99.4 100.2 100.6 100.4 
July 101.1 100.4 101.1 100.9 101.7 101.6 101.0 101.1 99.4 101.0 101.3 101.0 
August 100.4 99.6 100.1 99.8 100.2 99.1 101.0 100.3 98.7 100.7 101.4 100.1 
September 99.7 99.5 100.2 99.5 100.0 97.2 104.4 100.3 98.8 101.3 101.9 100.3 
October 101.3 102.0 101.3 100.1 101.5 97.9 106.0 99.9 100.5 101.9 102.9 101.4 
November 101.2 101.1 101.3 99.4 102.1 96.9 106.3 98.8 101.6 102.0 103.2 101.3 
December 103.7 103.1 104.4 100.6 104.2 98.7 111.0 99.4 104.8 104.6 104.5 103.5 
             
minimum 97.6 97.5 96.8 98.3 95.5 96.9 92.8 98.6 97.3 96.2 95.1 96.6 
maximum 103.7 103.1 104.4 102.6 104.2 106.4 111.0 101.6 104.8 104.6 104.5 104.6 
standard deviation 1.8 1.7 2.1 1.2 2.5 2.8 5.9 1.0 2.0 2.4 3.1 2.4 
 
Annual average in each year = 100. 
 
Source: authors’ calculations from Capie & Webber, 1985, Table III.(4), p. 444 
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Table 5: Composition of joint-stock banks’ aggregate balance sheets: percentages 
represented by main asset categories, 1860-1913, 1920-39 
 
 cash and near-
cash 
bills 
discounted 
investments advances 
Decade     
1860-69 13 31 11 45 
1870-79 17 27 12 48 
1880-89 21 26 17 38 
1890-99 22 17 21 42 
1900-09 24 11 18 46 
1910-13 26 13 16 45 
1920-29 21 13 20 44 
1930-39 21 11 30 36 
     
Year     
1930 22 14 19 43 
1931 21 12 21 44 
1932 20 16 28 34 
 
Sources: authors’ calculations from: Collins & Baker, 2001, p. 183, Table 2 (1860-
1913 decadal averages); Sheppard, 1971, pp. 116-117, Table (A) 1.1 (1920-29 and 
1930-39 decadal averages, and years 1930-32) 
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Table 6: ‘True’ capital as percentage of total assets, 1930-39 
 
year Barclays Lloyds Martins Midland National 
Provincial 
Westminster mean 
1930 8.7 n/a n/a 8.1 7.8 9.7 8.8 
1931 9.1 n/a n/a 9.1 8.2 9.7 8.6 
1932 7.8 7.4 10.9 7.6 7.1 8.9 8.5 
1933 7.9 7.7 11.7 8.3 7.2 9.0 8.7 
1934 7.9 7.9 11.5 8.3 7.3 9.4 8.7 
1935 7.4 7.7 10.9 7.9 n/a 9.3 8.5 
1936 7.2 7.9 10.9 7.5 n/a 8.5 8.3 
1937 7.4 7.4 10.6 7.8 7.7 8.5 8.3 
1938 7.1 7.6 10.1 8.4 8.2 9.1 8.0 
1939 6.7 7.0 n/a 8.2 7.6 7.8 7.2 
 
n/a = not available 
 
Sources: authors’ calculations from published accounts and archival sources: BGA: Barclays, 3/336, Martins, 38/569-579; LGA: research file of 
the bank’s historian, Winton: ‘Capital, Reserves, and Dividends’; HSBC Holdings plc, Group Archives, London (HSBCGA): Midland, 227/3, 
accounts volumes for relevant years (described as ‘black books’); RBSGA: National Provincial, volumes 9452 & 9480, Westminster, 13365 & 
13366. 
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Table 7: Bad debt experience, 1920-39 
 
bank 1920-29 
average 
1930-39 
average 
1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 
total bad debt provisions             
Barclays 1.7 3.1 2.7 2.9 3.9 4.0 4.0 3.9 3.1 2.8 2.7 1.5 
Martins 3.6 6.6 5.0 5.0 9.7 11.5 7.9 7.4 5.3 4.8 3.9 5.1 
Midland 2.7 4.0 3.7 4.0 n/a 4.5 4.6 4.2 3.9 3.7 3.9 3.6 
National Provincial 3.2 4.0 3.5 4.3 4.9 5.5 5.7 n/a n/a 3.0 2.6 2.1 
Westminster n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 5.2 
             
bad debt charge             
Barclays 0.5 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.5 
Lloyds 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Martins 0.4 0.8 0.6 0.6 2.2 1.7 1.7 0.4 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 1.0 
Midland 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.6 1.4 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.3 
National Provincial 0.4 0.8 1.4 1.1 0.3 0.6 0.7 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Westminster 0.6 0.5 1.0 0.9 0.6 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.6 0.9 
             
bad debt write-offs             
Barclays 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.8 1.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.7 0.2 0.2 1.8 
Westminster n/a 0.5 n/a 0.4 0.3 1.2 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.8 0.3 
 
n/a = not available 
 
Source: as Table 6, plus: RBSGA: National Provincial, volume 9451. 
 
Note: see text for definitions of the three measures of bad debt experience. 
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Table 8: Standstill exposures, 1931 and 1939 
 
 German 
Standstill 
1931 
£000s 
German 
Standstill 
1939 
£000s 
Hungarian 
Standstill 
1931 
£000s 
Austrian 
Standstill 
1931 
£000s 
source 
clearing banks      
Barclays 4,232 3,300 92
 1
 45
 1
 BGA, 1262/58, 200/10; Tuke & Gillman, 1972, p. 39 
      
Lloyds 1,988 438 n/a n/a LGA, HO/GM/OFF/28/2 
      
Martins n/a 242 n/a n/a BGA, 38/576 (Martins Board Minutes, 7 November 
1939) 
Midland 3,300 2,750 69 112 Holmes & Green, 1986, pp. 186-187; HSBCGA, 
O252/075 and O252/082 
      
National Provincial 1,280 nil n/a n/a LGA, HO/GM/OFF/28/2 (‘unofficial figures’) 
      
Westminster 2,779 3,034
 2
 
 
177 200 
3
 RBSGA, WES/1174/187, WES/1177/102 (1939), 
WES/114/120 (Austria) 
      
Williams Deacon’s 58 n/a n/a n/a RBSGA, WD/50/6 
      
clearing banks’ international 
subsidiaries 
     
Barclays DCO 575 390
 3
 n/a n/a BGA, 11/1831 and 80/665 
      
Barclays Bank France 560 203 n/a n/a BGA, 3/1534 and 1262/66 
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 German 
Standstill 
1931 
£000s 
German 
Standstill 
1939 
£000s 
Hungarian 
Standstill 
1931 
£000s 
Austrian 
Standstill 
1931 
£000s 
source 
Lloyds and National Provincial 
Foreign Bank 
4 
n/a 800
 5
 n/a n/a LGA, F/7/B/22 
      
Westminster Foreign Bank 1,021 nil
 2
 n/a n/a RBSGA, WES/1174/187 
 
Notes:  
 
n/a = not available 
1 = at May 1932 
2 = Westminster Foreign Bank’s exposures were taken over by its parent, Westminster, in 1935 (RBSGA, WES/1174/187) 
3 = at August 1938 
4 = Lloyds and National Provincial banks each owned 50% 
5 = deposits held with German banks at end-1937  
 
The 1931 figures are those for the date closest to the inception of the Standstill.  The 1939 figures are those for the date closest to the outbreak of 
war.  There are minor inconsistencies between the figures shown and those included in a schedule found on a Foreign Office file (National 
Archives, Kew, London, FO944/394), which shows balances outstanding at 3 September 1939. 
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Notes 
                                                          
1
  Austria £1.2 million and Hungary £5.5 million at the end of 1931: The Royal Bank 
of Scotland Group plc, Group Archives, London (RBSGA), WES/1174/120. 
2
  Barclays Bank PLC, Group Archives, Manchester (BGA), Martins Board Minutes, 
22 September 1931. 
3
  RBSGA, WES/1174/187, ‘Report of Chief General Manager’ to Board meeting of 
29 September 1936. 
4
  RBSGA, WES/1174/249. 
5
  BGA, 140/65, ‘Records of Advances Made, Mr. Murrell’s Section’. 
6
  Lloyds Banking Group plc, Group Archives, London (LGA), HO/D/BOA/MIN/36 & 
37, Main Board Minutes 1931. 
7
  LGA, HO/D/BOA/MIN/36, 28 July 1931. 
8
  RBSGA, LBI/14/2072; LBI/14/2078, pro-forma balance sheet. 
